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Abstract
Six years ago, The Economist wrote that investing retirement savings from aging
developed countries in the emerging markets of still-youthful developing countries
promised to "beat demography."  As labor force growth slows in the North, runs this
argument, capital becomes abundant relative to labor and the rate of return to this
capital declines.  By investing in the South, not only do OECD investors earn a higher
rate of return on their savings, but the rate of return to that capital which remains in the
North is boosted as well, because there is less of it.
Working with a two-region neoclassical economic-demographic model, the
authors show that reallocating capital from North to South can, at most, only slightly
attenuate the negative macroeconomic impacts of population aging.  Moreover, the
reallocation gives rise to significant, and thus politically challenging, shifts in the
distribution of income between working- and retirement-age populations in both
regions.
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Landis MacKellar and Helmut Reisen
Introduction
“Once freed, money may well flow disproportionately to developing countries. For this is
the surest way to beat demography”, wrote The Economist six years ago (20 June 1992).
This paper aims at quantifying and testing that proposition via simulation analysis with a
two-region neoclassical economic-demographic growth model. The two regions
considered are “fast aging countries” (FACs; Region 1) and “slow aging countries” (SACs;
Region 2), corresponding fairly closely to the traditional “industrial-less developed” and
“OECD- non-OECD” aggregates. This paper will discuss two different scenarios with
respect to international capital mobility, comparing a baseline Autarchy Scenario with a
scenario of rapid financial integration between the two regions, the Globalization Scenario.
While the Autarchy Scenario corresponds to a continuation of home-asset preference
currently observed among portfolio managers, the Globalization Scenario is meant to
reflect exploitation of the global diversification benefits proclaimed by modern portfolio
theory.
Aggregate macroeconomic results, in terms of impacts of population aging and financial
globalization on output and income, savings, capital flows, and net foreign assets, are
similar to those obtained from simulation analysis with more advanced models (such as
the OECD’s Minilink model). What is gained from economic simplicity is added
demographic-, sectoral-, and distributional detail.
How can we summarize the relationship between global demographic dynamics and
financial globalization? It is widely understood that unfunded pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
pension schemes are locked into the aging economy. Less widely appreciated, however,
is the fact that even fully funded pension schemes are exposed to demographic pressures
so long as their assets remain invested in aging countries alone. When the baby-boom
generation starts to draw on funded pension schemes (around 2010), the impact of that
decumulation on asset prices, and thus on pension benefits, might be decidedly
negative.
The diversification of FAC retirement savings into SACs via investment in emerging
stock markets provides the prospect of higher expected return for a given level of risk
or, put differently, lower risk (as systemic volatility is reduced) for given expected
2return. The correlation between returns on established and emerging stock markets is
likely to remain low as financial globalization advances.1 This suggests that the benefits
of diversification will persist far into the future. The benefits of global portfolio
diversification also apply to emerging-economy financial managers, who could reduce
some of the risks stemming from high exposure to shocks in their own countries by
allocating a portion of their asset portfolios to established financial markets.
Table 1 documents the strong growth in OECD and non-OECD pension assets. The
table also shows that these are heavily invested into home assets (defined as assets held
in the home country of the investor only) although the home bias in OECD assets has
been reduced during the 1990s, including through investment into emerging markets.
The World Bank (1997) estimated that in 1995 around $70 billion was held by OECD
pension funds in the emerging markets.
Table 1. The home-asset preference in funded pension assets.
1990 1995a
Total pension assets ( billion $)
- OECD 4,813 7,865
- non-OECD    109    311
Home-asset share (% of Assets)b
- OECD pension assets   92.8 88.9
- non-OECD pension assetsc 100.0 99.3
(a) Estimate
(b) Home-assets share refers only to the share of assets invested in the home country of the investor.
(c) This excludes Hong Kong where the foreign asset share is 60%.
Source: InterSec Research Company.
The first section of the paper will highlight some salient aspects of global demographic
trends, which are likely to intensify the financial interdependence between the two regions.
The second section will present a simple two-region simulation model (details of which are
contained in Annexes 1 and 2). The third section will present and discuss the results of
several model runs, underlying assumptions for which are described in Annex 3. We
derive conclusions regarding macroeconomic benefits from financial integration, quantify
the volume of capital flows involved, and identify distributional impacts on the working-
age and retirement-age populations. In conclusion, we discuss the basic policy implications
of our analysis of the interaction between population aging and financial globalization.
1.  Demographic trends and their implications
“Global population aging” is a shorthand phrase used to describe a complicated set of
regionally distinct changes in population age composition (see Table 1). Closely
                                                
1
 Country-specific shocks take very different forms in the two regions, there is little harmonization of
economic policies, and economic and demographic structures will remain broadly divergent for many
decades to come.
3associated with changes in population age distribution are trends in aggregate
population growth, i.e., continued very slow rates of demographic increase in the North
and rapidly decelerating population growth in the South.
If “population aging” is defined as an increase in the average age of the population, all
populations are aging. However, when “population aging” is (as is more conventional)
defined as the transition from a high support ratio (population aged 15-59 divided by
population aged 60+) to a low support ratio, then the populations of the world fall into
two groups. In the first, consisting of populations in Europe, the European regions of the
Former Soviet Union, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, the support
ratio is declining rapidly from an already low base. In the second group, consisting of
populations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the support ratio is also declining, but it
will not reach levels currently seen in the first group of countries until the middle of the
next century. Thus, in this paper we divide the world into two regions based on the
support ratio: fast aging countries (FACs) and slow-aging countries (SACs).2
Despite the uncertainties in forecasting demographic trends over the next fifty or so
years, uncertainties that are mostly due to the difficulty of projecting fertility rates,
some demographic trends can be predicted with a high degree of confidence. Because of
their great importance for future economic interdependence, two salient aspects deserve
to be highlighted (see Table 2):
• FAC populations will age from the ‘middle’ of the age pyramid as the large
baby-boom cohort becomes elderly in approximately 2010. SAC populations, by
contrast, are aging from the ‘bottom’, suggesting that as today’s young persons
move into the working years, they are being replaced by a much smaller cohort
of children (due to rapid recent fertility decline). Therefore, the prospective
demographic changes imply divergent trends in labor force growth across the
two regions. Assuming that age- and sex-specific labor force participation rates
remain unchanged, labor force growth rates will rapidly decline in the FAC area
and turn negative after 2010. In strong contrast, age-distribution changes are
increasing the labor force in the SAC area; the proportion of the population in
the working-age bracket (15-59) will remain roughly constant despite a rapid
increase in the elderly population.
• Changes in the age composition of the population will have consequences for the
rate of net financial asset accumulation and on the rate of return of financial
assets. An important aspect of prospective age-structure changes is that these
will shift the balance between the age groups that may be characterized as prime
borrowers and prime savers. The United States, for example, features relatively
high household savings in the high-income age cohorts (40-59), whereas net
savings in the other age cohorts is low or negative (Attanasio, 1994).  As the
baby-boom generation filters through the peak asset accumulation years, the
prime savers ratio (population aged 40-59 divided by population aged 15+) will
rise until approximately 2010 in FACs and then commence an extended decline
(see Table 2).  In SACs this ratio will also rise until 2010; however, in contrast,
it will remain fixed at approximately 0.3 throughout the rest of the century.
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 To confuse matters, the rate of growth of the elderly population in the SACs is much more rapid than the
corresponding rate of growth in FACs, because the SACs are starting from a small base. The appelations
“fast-aging” and “slow-aging” make sense only with respect to the level of the support ratio.
4Table 2.  Population, by age group
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Fast-aging countries
Total population (million) 1,251 1,315 1,339 1,350 1,344 1,317 1,212
      Average annual % change 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
   Age 0-14 256 226 218 207 200 196 197
      Average annual % change -0.8 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.0
   Age 15-59 774 812 784 750 716 678 613
      Average annual % change 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2
   Age 60+ 221 278 336 392 428 443 402
      Average annual % change 1.5 1.9 1.6 0.9 0.4 -0.2
Age structure (%)
   Age 0-14 20.5 17.2 16.3 15.3 14.9 14.9 16.3
   Age 15-59 61.9 61.7 58.6 55.6 53.3 51.5 50.6
   Age 60+ 17.7 21.1 25.1 29.0 31.8 33.6 33.2
Support ratio (population 15-59 :
population 60+)
3.5 2.9 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5
Prime savers ratio (population 40-59:
population 15+)
0.31 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.27
Slow-aging countries
Total population (million) 4,451 5,696 6,539 7,321 7,995 8,593 9,188
      Average annual % change 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.1
   Age 0-14 1,534 1,765 1,902 1,965 1,973 1,997 1,583
      Average annual % change 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.5
   Age 15-59 2,595 3,430 3,934 4,375 4,783 5,069 5,187
      Average annual % change 1.9 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.0
   Age 60+ 322 501 703 981 1,239 1,527 2,418
      Average annual % change 3.0 3.4 3.4 2.4 2.1 0.9
Age structure (%)
   Age 0-14 34.5 31.0 29.1 26.8 24.7 23.2 17.2
   Age 15-59 58.3 60.2 60.2 59.8 59.8 59.0 56.5
   Age 60+ 7.2 8.8 10.8 13.4 15.5 17.8 26.3
Support ratio (population 15-59 :
population 60+)
8.1 6.8 5.6 4.5 3.9 3.3 2.1
Prime savers ratio (population 40-59:
Population 15+)
0.25 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31
5In a closed economy, the neoclassical response to slowing labor force growth is to
substitute capital for labor, leading to an increase in the capital-output ratio and a
corresponding reduction in the rate of return to capital. Pari passu, the rate of return to
saving declines, leading households to consume rather than save, so the economy’s
reduced demand for investment expenditure is matched by a reduced supply of savings.
In long-run equilibrium, the result of population aging (independent of changes in the
rate of growth of total population) is reduced per capita output and consumption.
In an open economy, the situation is complicated, because households have the option
of purchasing assets installed abroad, where the rate of return to capital may be higher.
A number of studies (Cutler et al., 1990; Masson and Tryon, 1990; Yoo, 1994; Börsch-
Supan, 1996; Higgins, 1997; OECD 1998) have concluded that global demographic
divergences should stimulate capital flows from the most rapidly aging regions
(especially Europe and Japan) to less rapidly aging regions (especially North America
and the less developed countries), where the capital-output ratio is lower and the rate of
return to capital is higher. With a significant proportion of FAC savings being invested
in SACs, capital returns and saving rates, as well as per capita output and consumption,
would be higher in the FACs vis à vis the autarchy case.
However, simulations with the OECD Minilink model, based on a modified version of
the Blanchard consumption model, led the authors to caution that any benefits from
investment abroad are likely to be small. As the authors wrote (OECD, 1998, p. 28):
The accumulation of the net foreign assets by an OECD country, particularly a small country
which faces aging soon, might provide a small but significant contribution to living standards
through future net investment income. However, given the potentially adverse effects on
domestic productivity of shifting investment away from domestic sources, such effects are likely
to be very limited in offsetting the effects of aging. … The scope for many/most OECD
countries to obtain such beneficial effects are likely to be even more limited, given that increased
investment in the non-OECD will progressively lower the return on such investments.
Our simulation confirms these results despite the fact that a simple accounting model is
used. We extend previous studies by incorporating detailed demographic trends and
providing more fine-grained results for sectoral and distributional outcomes.
2.  A simulation model
We have developed, based on work originally presented by Blanchet and Kessler
(1992), a simple neoclassical two-region, two-factor economic-demographic model,
which is described in Annexes 1 and 2.
Age-specific saving and labor force participation rates are exogenous; thus, the IIASA
model in its present form is essentially an accounting model. For a given population
size, age structure has three effects on per capita income: first, through the labor force
as it affects the number of workers relative to nonworkers; second, through capital
formation, as it affects the number of savers relative to dissavers; third, and also through
capital formation, as it affects the wage rate and rate of return to capital, which in turn
determine the income streams that give rise to saving. In concentrating on relatively
detailed age-structure effects, our work complements other analyses (e.g., Cutler et al.,
1990; Börsch-Supan, 1996), where the impact of population aging is mediated through
the life cycle hypothesis (LCH) of household consumption. Closely related to these are
6linked international macroeconomic model-based analyses (e.g., Masson and Tryon,
1990; OECD 1998), in which the impact of aging is mediated through the major
macroeconomic functions, particularly the aggregate consumption/saving  function.
Given theoretical ambiguities, a simple accounting model with ample demographic
detail provides a useful benchmark for work with more economically sophisticated, but
demographically sparse, models.
Savings are allocated to investment projects at home and abroad by means of exogenous
capital-flow coefficients, and investment in each region is equal to domestic plus
foreign savings. A rise in foreign savings is assumed to be mirrored by a corresponding
rise in domestic capital formation: the possibility that additional foreign savings might
merely inflate asset prices or fuel consumption is not allowed for and the current
account is assumed to adjust passively to changes in capital inflows.3 The exchange rate
plays no explicit role, and all economic variables are expressed in 1995 US dollars.
As illustrated in Table 3, the model tracks receipts and disbursements, and thus net
savings, by institutional sector (households, firms, government).4 Capital consists of
residential capital, capital operated by private unincorporated enterprises (PUEs), and
capital operated by firms (i.e., corporate enterprises). The first two types of capital are
installed exclusively in the home region. Imputed rents (in the case of residental capital)
and the profits of PUEs accrue directly to households. Capital operated by firms is
installed both at home and abroad; these firms earn profits, pay taxes and distribute
dividends to holders of claims.5 Direct taxation follows the principle of taxation at the
source, meaning that capital returns are taxed only once, when, and where they are
earned.6
These claims are held on behalf of households by two financial intermediaries: the
private pension system (PPS) and other institutions (OIs). When receipts and
expenditures are summed across households aged 15-59, households aged 60+, the PPS,
and OIs, cancellations bring us to the net household savings accounting concept, which
is familiar from the OECD national accounts.
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 However, to the extent that foreign capital inflows depress the rate of return to capital and thus the rate
of profit on existing capital, the model incorporates a second-round offset in the form of lower domestic
savings. This is in line with empirical evidence which suggests that only about one-half of a given
increment to foreign savings translates into added investment.
4
 Following the convention of the OECD national income accounts, net savings in each sector of the
economy are defined as gross receipts minus depreciation (see the next footnote) minus expenditure. The
sum of net savings across sectors is equal to net saving for the economy as a whole (national disposable
income minus private consumption minus government consumption), which in turn is equal to change in
total capital assets (installed both at home and abroad).
5Depreciation (and indirect taxes) are deducted from profits at the level of the firm or, in the case of
residential capital and capital operated by PUEs, at the level of the household. Thus, in Table 3, income
derived from profits is already net of depreciation and indirect taxes, and there is no need for separate
expenditure lines to cover these outlays. The only complication is that depreciation and indirect taxes
must subsequently be accounted for in the calculation of  GNP and national disposable income (see
Annex 1).
6
 Thus, neither the PPS nor OIs pay taxes on dividends received, taxes have already been paid by firms
when profits were earned. Elderly persons, who receive annuity income from the PPS and OIs, also pay
no direct taxes on this income. Profits on capital owned by foreign investors, whether portfolio investors
or foreign direct investors, are taxed in the region in which the capital is installed, i.e., where the profits
were earned.
7Table 3: Sources of savings, FACs, Region 1.
Households
1. Population aged 15-59 2. Population aged 60+
Receipts Receipts
   Compensation of employees
   Entrepreneurial income (net of depreciation and indirect tax)
   Imputed housing services (net of depreciation and indirect tax))
   Transfers incl. bequests (from pop. aged 60+)
   Compensation of employees
   Annuity payments from PPS and OIs
   Social security benefits
Disbursements Disbursements
   Direct tax
   Workers’ social security contributions
   Employers’ social security contributions
   Workers’ contributions to private pension plans
   Employers’ contributions to private pension plans
   Consumption
       From after-tax compensation of employees
       From after-tax entrepreneurial income
       Imputed housing services
       From transfers incl.  bequests
    Direct tax
    Workers’ social-security contributions
    Employers’ social-security contributions
    Workers’ contributions to private pension plans
    Employers’ contributions to private pension plans
    Consumption
       From after-tax compensation of employees
       From annuity income
       From social security benefits
    Transfers incl. bequests (to pop. aged 15-59)
3. Private Pension System (PPS) 4. Other Institutions (OI)
Receipts Receipts
   Dividends distributed from profits on capital installed in Region 1
   Dividends distributed from profits on capital installed in Region 2 (portfolio claims
    only)
   Workers’ contributions to PPS
   Employers’ contributions to PPS
Disbursements
   Annuity payments to retirees
   Dividends distributed from profits on capital installed
   in Region 1
   Dividends distributed from profits on capital
   installed in Region 2 (portfolio claims only)
   Dividends distributed from repatriated profits on FDI
   abroad
   Capital returns to residential capital and capital
   Operated by PUEs  (portion owned by 60+
    population
    only)
Disbursements
    Annuity payments to population aged 60+
       Capital operated by firms
       Residential capital and capital  operated by PUEs
Net savings of households (sum of receipts minus disbursements over 1-4)
Firms
Receipts
   Profits on capital installed in Region 1 (net of depreciation and indirect tax; excl.
   profits on FDI from abroad)
   Profits on capital installed in Region 2 (FDI only, net of depreciation and indirect
   tax)
Disbursements
   Direct tax to government in Region 1 (on first line under “Receipts”)
   Direct tax to government in Region 2 (on second line under “Receipts”)
   Dividends distributed to domestic holders of claims on capital installed in Region 1
   Dividends distributed to foreign holders of claims on capital installed in Region 1
   (portfolio claims only)
   Dividends distributed from repatriated profits on FDI abroad





Employers’ contributions to social security




Net savings of government
8The PPS represents fully funded, defined-contribution pension plans; the model does
not specify a private PAYG, defined-benefit component. The rationale for not including
a private PAYG component is two-fold. First, the role of private PAYG pension funds
is shrinking rapidly, as few new workers are being offered such arrangements. Second,
the obligations of this component of the pension system are essentially underwritten by
public authorities (e.g., the Pension Benefits Guarantee Corporation in the US), as a
result of which, the distinction between the private and public PAYG systems is blurred.
Implicitly, the private PAYG pension system is subsumed under the public PAYG
pension system in our model.
OIs are a residual sector in our model, covering banks, insurance companies, mutual
funds, and other financial intermediaries apart from pension funds. Implicitly, OIs also
include individual households, to the extent that the latter hold financial claims directly.
The distinction between portfolio investment and foreign direct investment (FDI) is a
significant one.7 As a number of observers have pointed out, investors who purchase
shares of a domestically based multinational firm are effectively acquiring an
international asset to the extent that the firm operates globally. FDI, consisting mainly
of the acquisition of fully-owned foreign subsidiaries by multinational firms, is one of
the principal corporate globalization strategies.
In our model, we recognize that firms in both regions earn profits both at home and
abroad.  Firms in Region 1 are credited with profits earned on that portion of Region 1’s
capital stock that is owned by foreign portfolio investors, and are debited with taxes and
dividends paid out of these profits (to the government of Region 1 in the first case, to
the PPS and OIs of Region 2, in the second case). However, profits on that portion of
Region 1’s capital stock that represent FDI from Region 2 are credited to firms in
Region 2. Taxes paid out of these profits are debited to firms in Region 2 and credited to
the government of Region 1.  Firms in Region 2 choose to reinvest a given share of
these profits in Region 1; the remainder they repatriate to Region 2, where dividends are
paid out to claimants.
Who are these claimants?  Historically, PPS portfolio managers have engaged almost
exclusively in portfolio investment.  Almost all FDI has originated in firms, largely in
the form of the acquisition of fully owned foreign subsidiaries. Since firms in our model
only operate, but do not own, capital, we make the simplifying assumption that FDI is
undertaken by corporate holding companies who are implicitly subsumed under OIs,
and the share of OI foreign assets consisting of FDI is an exogenous variable.
Dividends paid out of repatriated profits on FDI from Region 2 in Region 1 are credited
to OIs in Region 2.  Symmetrically, profits on FDI from Region 1 in Region 2 are
credited to firms in Region 1, and dividends paid out of repatriated earnings are credited
to OIs in Region 1.
Flows of income from capital must ultimately be allocated to households.  The capital
stock as a whole is divided into portions owned by the working-age (15-59 years) and
retirement-age (60+ years) population. The shares used to apportion the capital stock
between the working- and retirement-age populations are functions of the age
distribution of the population, the rate of economic growth, and the rate of return to
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 FDI is defined as the acquisition of 20% or more of the outstanding equity in a foreign corporation,
whereas acquisition of less than 20% of the outstanding equity of a foreign firm is referred to as portfolio
investment.
9capital (see Annex 2). Simulations indicate that the first of these is by far the most
important variable, suggesting that, in simulations where the age structure of the
population is identical in the baseline and alternative scenarios, simulation results are
robust to specification of the share variables.
The most important feature of the articulation of savings is that the model is able to
track the downward pressure on household saving and capital accumulation that is
expected as the baby boomers begin to retire (Schieber and Shoven, 1994).
Persons in the 15-59 year-old age bracket do not consume out the dividends that are
distributed from earnings on the capital they own (or, to put it more accurately, the PPS
and OIs that hold claims on behalf of persons 15-59 do not pass them along to the
claimants).  Persons over 60, whether they are still in the labor force or not, are assumed
to annuitize their portion of the capital stock, meaning that they receive (from the PPS
and OIs) an annuity that is based on the current rate of return to capital, the amount of
capital they own, and life expectancy at age sixty.   In the case of capital operated by
firms, the PPS and OIs receive dividends on, and pay out the annuity value of, the
retirement-age population´s assets. In the case of assets consisting of residential capital
and capital operated by PUEs, it is similarly assumed the OIs play the intermediary
role.8
Persons aged 15-59 earn wages, out of which they and their employers make pension
and social security contributions; they also earn profits on PUEs and receive imputed
services from their share of the stock of owner-occupied housing. Persons in the
retirement age bracket, in addition to receiving wages (if they work), receive annuity
income from the PPS and OIs based on their assets, and receive social security benefits.
Persons over 60 transfer unspent income from all sources to the population aged 15-59;
in this way, the model “annualizes” bequests.
The public social security system is assumed to be a balanced PAYG system, meaning
that social security contributions collected from workers are spread over the elderly
population.9 Pressures on the social security system in this model are reflected in
declining levels of benefit per member of the elderly population, rather than in higher
government budget deficits or higher social security taxes. This assumption can easily
be changed in model simulations; in the current political environment, however, the
assumption that replacement rates will be permitted to erode is more attractive than the
competing assumptions.
Particularly in less-developed countries, intrafamily transfers from children to parents
may be an important part of old-age support.  In our model, these are implicitly included
under the public PAYG pension system.
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 Implicitly, the retired population signs over its stock of residential and PUE capital to OIs in return for
an annuity; OIs in turn rent this capital out.
9
 In order to simplify accounting, persons over 60 are assumed to begin receiving social security income
whether they are still in the labor force or not.
10
3.  Simulation results
Model parameterization and scenario assumptions are presented in Annex 3.  The
simulation period is effectively from 1995 to 2050; however, we solved the model out
to 2100 and will occasionally refer to ultra long-term results. These obviously must be
taken with a degree of skepticism, and we will focus on the period 1995-2050.
Shifting asset allocation shares.  The key to the simulation is changes in assumptions on
the share of annual asset acquisition that consists of capital installed in the foreign
region.  We estimate that, in 1995, 1% of all purchases of assets by FAC pension fund
managers consisted of claims on capital installed in the SACs.10  For OIs, the
corresponding figure was 10%, the higher number being largely due to the role of FDI.
In the baseline scenario, which corresponds roughly to a situation of autarchy, the
foreign-investment share of the PPS is assumed to rise gradually to 10% between 1995
and 2005, then to remain constant through 2100.  The foreign-investment share of OIs is
assumed simply to remain constant at 10%. The share of OI foreign assets consisting of
FDI claims is assumed to remain constant at 50%, and the proportion of FDI earnings
reinvested is kept constant at 20%.
In the alternative scenario, designed to illustrate the impacts of financial globalization,
the allocation of FAC investment is shifted to reflect the share of SACs in global stock
market capitalization (estimated as total capital stocks minus residential capital stocks
minus capital operated by PUEs) and output.11  In the case of pension fund managers,
the share of annual investment expenditure allocated to SACs is set equal to that
region´s share in global stock market capitalization, approximately 15% in 1995, rising
to over 40% in 2050, and over 60% in 2100.12  In the case of OIs, the foreign investment
share was taken as a weighted average of the SACs´ shares in global stock market
capitalization and in world GDP, the weights reflecting the portfolio-FDI split in foreign
assets held by OIs.  The FDI share was assumed to rise linearly from 50% in 1995 to
66.7% in 2100, while the share of FDI earnings reinvested was set equal to Region 2´s
share in world GDP.  The rationale behind these assumptions is that, in a totally
integrated world market, the rigidities that lead international investors to prefer portfolio
claims to FDI should diminish, as should the disincentives to reinvesting earnings in the
host country.  The impact is to raise the share of OI investment allocated to SACs from
10% to 17% in the immediate term, rising to 50% in 2050 and 66% in 2100.
Aggregate GDP growth in SACs is likely to be more rapid than in FACs, per capita
income levels in SACs are likely to rise substantially, and age-distribution trends in
SACs are favorable for savings.  On all three counts, aggregate savings in SACs are
likely to play a growing role in the world economy, and assumptions made regarding
the behavior of SAC portfolio managers are an important aspect of scenario design.
In the Autarchy Scenario, the domestic investment share of SAC pension fund managers
is assumed to decline gradually from 99% in 1995 to 90% in 2005, after which it
                                                
10
 This is made up of explicit claims, and does not include implicit ones in the form of investment in
domestic multinationals.
11The two scenarios with respect to international capital mobility can be thought of as implying different
degrees of sovereign risk aversion.
12
 There is simultaneity, which the model captures, between capital-flow coefficients and regional market
shares.
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remains fixed.  The domestic investment share of OIs is assumed to remain constant at
90% throughout the simulation period.  These assumptions precisely mirror those made
for the FACs.
An alternative scenario where FAC portfolio managers diversify while SAC portfolio
managers continue to invest most of their capital domestically would give rise to a
lopsided global picture over the very long term. Under such a scenario, net foreign
assets of the FACs would grow explosively, as would net factor payments from SACs to
FACs, giving rise to unreasonable gaps between gross national product (GNP) and GDP
in both regions.  Moreover, recent experience indicates that when capital controls are
lifted, portfolio managers in emerging economies have been eager to diversify into more
mature financial markets.
Therefore, we assume in the Globalization Scenario that SAC portfolio managers also
begin to diversify internationally, although less aggressively than their FAC
counterparts.  Whereas FAC portfolio managers are assumed to rationalize their
investment allocation decisions instantly, SAC managers are assumed to do so slowly
over the course of the simulation period. The domestic investment share of the PPS,
after reaching 90% in 2005, is assumed to decline linearly by one-half percentage point
per year until it equals the SAC region´s share in global stock market capitalization.
This occurs at a domestic investment share of approximately 55% in the year 2075.
After this point, the PPS domestic investment share is assumed to move in line with the
SAC region´s share in global capitalization, rising to 60% at the end of the century.
Exactly the same assumption was made regarding the domestic investment share of OIs
in the SACs, the only difference being that the target share reflected shares in both stock
market capitalization and in world GDP.  This target was reached at a domestic market
share of 58% in 2070, after which the domestic investment share rose gradually to 66%
in 2100.  The share of FDI in OI foreign assets was assumed to rise linearly from 50%
to 66.7% over the simulation period and the share of FDI earnings reinvested in the host
region was set equal to the host region´s share in world GDP.  These assumptions are
identical to those made in the case of FACs.
Simulation results are shown in Tables 4-8 and Figures 1-3.
Baseline (Autarchy) Scenario. In the baseline Autarchy Scenario, as predicted by
theory, the capital-output ratio in FACs rises from 3.14 in 1995 to 4.23 in 2050, causing
the rate of return to capital to decline from 8.1% to 6.0% (see Table 4). With age-
specific saving rates held constant, and with no account taken of pressure on
government to engage in deficit spending in order to avert the decline in social security
benefits relative to real wages, the net national saving rate still declines from 8.3% in
1995 to 6.6% in 2050. This can be interpreted as a lower-bound estimate: if the model
incorporated a decline in age-specific saving rates as a result of the lower rate of return
to saving, an increase in the government deficit as public authorities strove to maintain
pension benefit levels, plus the impact of aging on health care expenditure, the decline
in the aggregate net saving rate in FACs would be steeper.
Total net annual capital flows from FACs to SACs rise from 0.6% of FAC GDP in 1995
to 0.8% in 2010-2030, then decline and turn negative in the second half of the century
(see Table 5 and Figure 1).  In level terms, total annual net capital flows from FACs to
SACs are projected to double from an estimated $172 billion in 1995 to $350 billion in
2010 and peak at $442 billion in 2030. Net capital flows originating from FAC pension
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Table 4.  Macroeconomic aggregates.
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
GDP (1995 US$ per capita)
   Fast-aging countries
      Autarchy 24,939 32,316 37,099 42,340 48,462 55,762 119,845
      Globalization 24,939 32,005 36,474 41,383 47,210 54,333 121,337
       Difference (%) 0.0 -1.0 -1.7 -2.3 -2.6 -2.6 1.2
   Slow-aging countries
      Autarchy 1,554 2,488 3,381 4,581 6,237 8,398 37.950
      Globalization 1,554 2,579 3,547 4,817 6,532 8,726 37,751
      Difference (%) 0.0 3.7 4.9 5.2 4.7 3.8 -0.5
   World
      Autarchy 6,685 8,083 9,112 10,458 12,313 14,695 47,494
      Globalization 6,685 8,099 9,144 10,508 12,385 14,788 47,493
      Difference (%) 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.0
GNP (1995 US$ per capita)
   Fast-aging countries
      Autarchy 25,013 32,610 37,551 42,934 49,179 56,568 119,595
      Globalization 25,013 32,594 37,568 43,079 49,615 57,535 128,669
      Difference (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.7 7.6
   Slow-aging countries
      Autarchy 1,533 2,420 3,288 4,472 6,117 8,275 29,052
      Globalization 1,533 2,443 3,324 4,505 6,128 8,235 29,413
      Difference (%) 0.0 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.2 -0.5 1.2
Capital-output ratio
   Fast-aging countries
      Autarchy 3.14 3.37 3.62 3.85 4.05 4.23 4.60
      Globalization 3.14 3.30 3.50 3.68 3.84 4.02 4.72
      Difference 0.00 -0.07 -0.12 -0.17 -0.21 -0.22 0.12
   Slow-aging countries
      Autarchy 2.50 2.46 2.50 2.54 2.58 2.64 2.94
      Globalization 2.50 2.64 2.75 2.82 2.84 2.85 2.91
      Difference 0.00 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.21 -0.03
Net saving rate
   Fast-aging countries
      Autarchy 8.3 8.7 8.1 7.5 7.0 6.6 6.2
      Globalization 8.3 8.8 8.3 7.8 7.5 7.3 7.0
      Difference 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
   Slow-aging countries
      Autarchy 9.0 10.6 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.3 9.1
      Globalization 9.0 10.2 10.0 9.8 9.7 9.5 8.8
      Difference 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3
Rate of return to capital
   Fast-aging countries
      Autarchy 0.081 0.076 0.070 0.066 0.063 0.060 0.055
      Globalization 0.081 0.077 0.073 0.069 0.066 0.063 0.054
      Difference 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.001
   Slow-aging countries
      Autarchy 0.092 0.094 0.092 0.090 0.089 0.087 0.078
      Globalization 0.092 0.087 0.084 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.079
      Difference 0.000 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 0.001
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Table 5.  International capital flows.
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Net capital flows, fast- to slow-aging countries (billion 1995 US$)
   Private pension system
      Autarchy 9 102 134 160 177 182 -187
      Globalization 9 320 492 669  831 957  607
      Difference 0 217 358 508 654 775  794
   Other  institutions
      Autarchy 163 248 281 282 233 126 -1,969
      Globalization 163 653 949 1,227 1,431 1,483 310
      Difference 0 405 668 945 1,198 1,358 2,279
   Total
      Autarchy 172 350 415 442 410 308 -2,156
      Globalization 172 972 1,441 1,896 2,262 2,440 917
      Difference 0 623 1,026 1,454 1,851 2,132 3,072
Net capital flows, fast- to slow-aging countries (% of fast-aging country GDP)
   Private pension system
      Autarchy 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.1
      Globalization 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 136 0.4
      Difference 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.5
   Other institutions
      Autarchy 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.2 -1.4
      Globalization 0.5 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.1 0.2
      Difference 0.0 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.6
   Total
      Autarchy 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.4 -1.5
      Globalization 0.6 2.3 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.4 0.6
      Difference 0.0 1.5 2.1 2.6 2.9 3.0 2.1
Net foreign assets : GDP (%)
   Fast-aging countries
      Autarchy 2.6 7.7 9.9 10.8 10.3 8.4 -19.2
      Globalization 2.6 17.3 28.3 38.1 45.1 48.1 -2.8
      Difference 0.0 9.6 18.4 27.3 34.8 39.7 16.4
   Slow-aging countries
      Autarchy -11.7 -23.0 -22.2 -18.3 -13.4 -8.6 8.0
      Globalization -11.7 -49.4 -59.7 -60.3 -54.8 -45.9 1.2
      Difference 0.0 -26.4 -37.4 -41.9 -41.3 -37.3 -6.8
Foreign portfolio share (foreign assets as % of total assets)
Fast-aging countries
   Private pension system
      Autarchy 0.9 4.7 6.4 7.4 8.0 8.4 9.4
      Globalization 0.9 12.5 18.3 23.1 27.3 31.1 45.5
      Difference 0.0 7.8 11.9 15.7 19.4 22.8 36.2
   Other institutions
      Autarchy 3.5 6.8 7.9 8.7 9.2 9.6 10.9
      Globalization 3.5 12.2 17.5 22.5 27.3 32.2 55.8
      Difference 0.0 5.4 9.6 13.8 18.1 22.6 44.9
Slow-aging countries
   Private pension system
      Autarchy 0.3 6.8 8.4 9.1 9.5 9.7 9.9
      Globalization 0.3 7.4 11.6 15.4 19.4 23.3 39.1
      Difference 0.0 0.6 3.1 6.3 9.9 13.7 29.2
   Other institutions
      Autarchy 3.4 6.2 7.9 8.8 9.3 9.6 10.0
      Globalization 3.4 7.0 11.3 15.6 20.0 24.3 36.4
      Difference 0.0 0.9 3.4 6.8 10.7 14.7 26.3
Share in global market capitalization (%)
   Fast-aging countries
      Autarchy 85.0 77.6 73.2 68.7 64.1 59.5 39.9
      Globalization 85.0 72.7 66.0 60.3 55.5 51.5 41.3
      Difference 0.0 -4.9 -7.1 -8.4 -8.6 -7.9 1.5
   Slow-aging countries
      Autarchy 15.0 22.4 26.8 31.3 35.9 40.5 60.2
      Globalization 15.0 27.3 34.0 39.7 44.5 48.5 58.7
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funds peak at $182 billion in mid-century, and flows from OIs peak earlier (2030) at
$282 billion.
Net foreign assets of FACs peak at 10.8% of GDP in 2030 and turn negative in roughly
2070 (see Table 5 and Figure 2). In the Autarchy Scenario, the share of SAC assets in
the portfolio of FAC-based private pension funds rises from 0.9% in 1995 to 8.4% in
2050 and 9.4% at the end of the century.  The share of SAC assets in the portfolio of
OIs rises from 3.5% to 9.6% in 2050 and 10.9% in 2100. These apparently substantial
increases must be viewed in context, however.  The share of SACs in global market
capitalization is projected to rise from 15% in 1995 to 40.5% in 2050 and 60.2% in
2100. The share of the SACs in global output is projected to increase from 18.1% in
1995 to 49.6% in 2050 and 70.6% in 2100.  Thus, by either metric, the Autarchy
Scenario actually implies disintegration of global financial markets over the next
century.
The pressures of population aging on public pension systems must be apportioned
between lower replacement rates, higher public sector budget deficits, and higher wage-
based payroll taxes. In constructing the baseline scenario, we have kept direct and
indirect tax rates, as well as social security contribution rates, constant. As a result (see
Table 8), social security income per person aged 60+ stagnates between 1995 and 2050
(average annual growth of 0.3% per year, outright decline during the period 2010-
2030), a period over which the real wage rate grows at a rate of 1.8% per year. As a
result, the ratio of total income per person aged 60+ and total income per person aged
15-59 declines from 0.55 in 1995 to 0.31 in 2050, after which it remains constant (see
Table 8). In SACs, the income ratio declines from 0.51 in 1995 to 0.30 in 2050 and 0.25
in 2100. In both FACs and SACs, total income per capita of the 60+ population grows
in level terms (albeit very slowly) over the entire simulation period, and it is only
relative to the working-age population that the elderly lose ground.
Alternative (Globalization) Scenario. Neoclassical theory suggests that the greater
international integration of capital markets in the Globalization Scenario should lead, on
a baseline versus alternative scenario basis, to (i) lower spreads between rates of return
to capital and (ii) a more efficient allocation of productive resources, leading to
convergence of per capita output between the two regions. World GDP per capita
should rise, as capital is reallocated to the region characterized by a higher marginal
product. GDP per capita should fall in FACs and rise in SACs as a result of the transfer
of capital. GNP per capita should rise in FACs as a result of globalization, as capital
returns are higher abroad than at home. As long as the marginal product of capital
invested from abroad exceeds the capital returns accruing to foreign investors, GNP
should also rise in SACs.
Implications for net capital flows.  In the Globalization Scenario, as shown in Table 5,
roughly one-third of FAC investment portfolios is projected to consist of SAC assets in
2050 (31.1% for the PPS and 32.2% for the OIs).  This share is estimated to rise to
about one-half by the end of the next century (45.5% in the case of the PPS and 55.8%
in the case of the OIs).  The share of the SACs in global market capitalization is
estimated to be 48.5% in 2050 and 58.7% in 2100; their share in world GDP for the
same years is projected to be 51.2% and 70.2%, respectively. Thus, even our
Globalization Scenario falls somewhat short of the degree of financial integration that
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In SACs, 23.3% of the PPS investment portfolio and 24.3% of the OI investment
portfolio are projected to consist of FAC assets in 2050 (i.e., domestic shares of 76.6%
and 75.7%, respectively).  In 2100, the domestic shares are projected to decline to
58.7% for the PPS and 41.3% for OIs.
Under the Globalization Scenario, net annual capital flows from FACs to SACs rise
steadily from 0.6% of GDP in 1995 to 3.6% in 2040, then recede to 3.4% in 2050 and
0.6% at the end of the century (see Table 5 and Figure 1). Sustained capital flows of this
magnitude are not unprecedented and can be reconciled with the observed weakening
(Taylor, 1997) of the Feldstein-Horioka criterion (i.e., the historically strong association
between domestic savings and investment). Net PPS capital flows, estimated to have
been $9 billion in 1995, rise to $957 billion in 2050 and diminish in the second half of
the century. Net annual capital flows from OIs increase from $163 billion in 1995 to a
peak of $1,483 billion in 2050 and then decline.
Because output and assets grow more rapidly in SACs than in FACs, the long-term
evolution of net foreign assets is sensitive to the investment allocation behavior of SAC
portfolio managers. Under the assumptions of the Autarchy Scenario, net foreign assets
of FACs are projected to peak at 10.8% of FAC GDP in 2030 before diminishing (see
Table 5 and Figure 2); under the Globalization Scenario they peak at roughly 50% of
GDP in 2050.  Under the Autarchy Scenario, the FACs switch from being a net creditor
region to a net debtor region in approximately 2070; under the Globalization Scenario,
the switch is delayed until the very end of the century.
Per capita output and income. Model simulation results conform to the basic
predictions of neoclassical theory (see Table 4). Per capita GDP in the FACs is reduced
by 1.0% (vis à vis the Autarchy Scenario) in 2010, with the impact rising steadily to
2.6% by 2040-50. Per capita GDP in SACs increases by 3.7% in 2010, with the impact
rising to 5.2% in 2030 and then lessening to 3.8% in 2050.  By the very end of the
simulation periods, the impacts have been reversed: per capita GDP is marginally higher
in FACs and lower in SACs as a result of globalization.  Not much significance should
be read into the ultra long-term results, which depend crucially on the assumptions
made regarding the allocation of SAC savings.  Improved allocation of capital under the
Globalization Scenario is estimated to increase GDP per capita for the world as a whole
(versus the autarchy case) by 0.2% in 2010, with the impact rising to 0.6% in 2050 and
then disappearing entirely by 2100.
Globalization has no impact on per capita GNP in FACs until 2030, when it is estimated
to lead to a 0.3% increase vis à vis the Autarchy Scenario.  Unlike the case of GDP, the
impact steadily rises, to 0.9% in 2040, 1.7% in 2050, and 7.6% in 2100.  The
explanation for the growing impact lies in the fact that net factor payments reflect
cumulative capital flows. Globalization increases per capita GNP in SACs by roughly
1.0% in 2010-2020, after which the impact diminishes.  By mid-century, GNP per
capita is estimated to be marginally lower in the Globalization Scenario than in the
Autarchy Scenario; however, by the end of the simulation period this has reversed itself.
Once again, results for the end of the simulation period should be taken with a degree of
skeptizism.
Rates of return to capital. As expected, increased investment abroad under the
Globalization Scenario causes the rate of return to capital in FACs to rise vis à vis the
Autarchy Scenario (see Table 4 and Figure 3). However, the magnitude of this increase
(10 basis points in 2010, rising to 30 basis points in 2030-2050) is virtually
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insignificant. This attenuates only one-seventh of the aging-induced decline in the rate
of return to capital envisioned in the Autarchy Scenario (210 basis points between 1995
and 2050).
So trivial a gain would not appear to compensate FAC savers for the risks implied by
heavy exposure to SAC financial markets.13 However, when the question is posed in
terms of the ex post gain to retirement savers, the risk-return picture is more reasonable.
Under the Globalization Scenario, annuity income per capita of the 60+ year-old
population is increased by 7.1% (as compared to the Autarchy Scenario) in 2010, rising
to 12.9% in 2040 before starting to decline (see Table 8).
Both absolutely and proportionally speaking, the decline in SAC rates of return to
capital that can be attributed to globalization (70 basis points in 2010, 90 basis points in
2020-2030, returning to 70 basis points in 2050) is much more significant. This is
because the capital transfer implied by globalization is greater relative to the SAC
capital stock than it is relative to the FAC capital stock. Even under conditions of
globalization, the rate of return to capital in SACs is projected to stay well above that in
FACs throughout the simulation period. However, the convergence of rates of return
attributable to globalization, on the order of 100-120 basis points in 2020-2050, is
significant.
Net saving rates. Globalization is estimated to augment the net saving rate in FACs by
one-tenth of a percentage point in 2010, rising steadily to seven-thenths of a percentage
point by 2050 and continuing to rise into the very long term (see Table 4 and Figure 3).
Analysis of the components of saving reveals that this increase in aggregate savings is
entirely attributable to increases in corporate retentions (see Table 6). Some of this
represents higher profit margins on domestic capital, while some represents reinvested
earnings on that portion of investment abroad that consists of FDI. The failure of
household savings to rise in the face of globalization largely reflects lower levels of real
wages. However, simulation results do not reflect the possible impact of enhanced rates
of return on household saving rates. In SACs, globalization acts to depress savings,
mostly through downward pressure on profits.
Distributional impacts. The distributional impacts of globalization are much discussed,
but the generational dimension is under-appreciated (see Tables 7, 8). The impact of
increased capital mobility on the aged population is theoretically ambiguous, despite the
simplicity of the model. Elderly persons’ income depends on past earnings, which
determine savings, the rate of return earned by these savings, and current receipts of the
PAYG pension system. Greater investment of FAC pension funds in SACs should
reduce the capital-labor ratio, thus reducing the wages of FAC workers, and hence their
savings. On the contrary, however, those pension savings that are invested domestically
earn a higher rate of return and those pension savings that are invested in the SACs reap
a premium to the extent that the interregional rate-of-return gap persists. PAYG pension
                                                
13
 Rates of return implicitly incorporate sovereign and other risk premia. Global financial markets have
been characterized by inconsistent pricing of sovereign risk, as the yield spread (over US treasury bill rates)
on sovereign dollar bonds issues by non-OECD governments has fluctuated wildly. In one panel estimate
including both OECD and non-OECD sovereign dollar bonds, the yield spread has been found to be
significantly linked  to net foreign debt as a percentage of GDP. It was estimated that each percentage point
rise in net foreign debt raises the dollar bond yield spread by 0.5 basis points (Larrain et al., 1997). If the
model were to incorporate a risk premium in SAC rates of return, which would rise in line with net
foreign liabilities, the story would change accordingly.
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Table 6.  Savings, by sector.
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Fast-aging countries
Total savings (% of GDP)
   Autarchy 8.3 8.7 8.1 7.5 7.0 6.6 6.2
   Globalization 8.3 8.8 8.3 7.8 7.5 7.3 7.0
   Difference 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7
Households
   Autarchy 5.4 5.2 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.9 4.0
   Globalization 5.4 5.2 4.6 4.2 4.0 3.9 4.0
   Difference 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Firms
   Autarchy 3.1 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.5
   Globalization 3.1 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4
   Difference 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9
Government
   Autarchy -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1 -1.3
   Globalization -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.4
   Difference 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1
Slow-aging countries
Total savings (% of GDP)
   Autarchy 9.0 10.6 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.3 9.1
   Globalization 9.0 10.2 10.0 9.8 9.7 9.5 8.8
   Difference 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3
Households
   Autarchy 5.0 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.3 3.8
   Globalization 5.0 5.0 4.8 4.5 4.4 4.1 3.6
   Difference 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Firms
   Autarchy 2.3 3.8 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.0
   Globalization 2.3 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.9
   Difference 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1
Government
   Autarchy 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.3
   Globalization 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3
   Difference 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
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Table 7.  Income, population aged 15-59 years.
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Fast-aging countries
Total income
(1995 US$ per capita)
   Autarchy 29,723 37,525 44,460 52,594 62,035 73,089 157,374
   Globalization 29,723 37,311 43,991 51,824 60,973 71,825 158,769
   Difference (%) 0.0 -0.6 -1.1 -1.5 -1.7 -1.7 0.9
Compensation of employees
   Autarchy 26,516 34,302 41,251 49,317 58,633 69,537 152,168
   Globalization 26,516 33,972 40,556 48,203 57,118 67,755 154,063
   Difference (%) 0.0 -1.0 -1.7 -2.3 -2.6 -2.6 1.2
Entrepreneurial income
   Autarchy 1,566 1,531 1,478 1,468 1,487 1,517 2,119
   Globalization 1,566 1,585 1,582 1,625 1,691 1,750 1,886
   Difference (%) 0.0 3.5 7.0 10.7 13.8 15.4 -11.0
Imputed housing services
   Autarchy 1,542 1,569 1,550 1,569 1,616 1,672 2,453
   Globalization 1,542 1,624 1,659 1,737 1,838 1,929 2,179
   Difference (%) 0.0 3.5 7.0 10.7 13.8 15.4 -11.2
Transfers (incl. bequests)
   Autarchy 99 124 180 239 300 363 634
   Globalization 99 131 193 260 326 391 641
   Difference (%) 0.0 5.3 7.4 8.5 8.7 7.8 1.1
Slow-aging countries
Total income
(1995 US$ per capita)
   Autarchy 1,932 2,912 3,902 5,260 7,099 9,616 44,176
   Globalization 1,932 2,984 4,039 5,458 7,344 9,888 43,904
   Difference (%) 0.0 2.5 3.5 3.8 3.5 2.8 -0.6
Compensation of employees
   Autarchy 1,757 2,715 3,678 4,988 6,753 9,171 42,402
   Globalization 1,757 2,815 3,859 5,245 7,072 9,528 42,180
   Difference (%) 0.0 3.7 4.9 5.2 4.7 3.9 -0.5
Entrepreneurial income
   Autarchy 85 92 101 119 146 183 677
   Globalization 85 79 81 92 114 146 655
   Difference (%) 0.0 -14.4 -20.1 -22.3 -22.1 -20.2 -3.2
Imputed housing services
   Autarchy 84 97 112 135 172 219 839
   Globalization 84 83 89 105 134 175 812
   Difference (%) 0.0 -14.3 -20.1 -22.4 -22.2 -20.3 -3.2
Transfers (incl. bequests)
   Autarchy 6 7 11 19 28 43 258
   Globalization 6 6 10   16 24 39 257
   Difference (%) 0.0 -13.2 -13.8 -12.9 -11.2 -9.2 -0.5
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Table 8.  Income, population aged 60+ years.
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Fast-aging countries
Total income
(1995  US$ per capita)
   Autarchy 16,451 17,942 18,366 18,930 20,313 22,466 46,500
   Globalization 16,451 17,999 18,439 18,998 20,352 22,463 47,065
   Difference (%) 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0 1.2
Compensation of employees
   Autarchy 1,768 2,287 2,750 3,288 3,909 4,636 10,145
   Globalization 1,768 2,265 2,704 3,214 3,808 4,517 10,271
   Difference (%) 0.0 -1.0 -1.7 -2.3 -2.6 -2.6 1.2
Annuity income
   Autarchy 2,858 2,837 3,237 3,437 3,654 3,941 6,127
   Globalization 2,858 3,039 3,566 3,854 4,124 4,413 6,190
   Difference (%) 0.0 7.1 10.1 12.1 12.9 12.0 1.0
Social security benefits (incl.
intrafamily transfers)
   Autarchy 11,825 12,818 12,378 12,206 12,750 13,889 30,228
   Globalization 11,825 12,695 12,170 11,930 12,420 13,533 30,605
   Difference (%) 0.0 -1.0 -1.7 -2.3 -2.6 -2.6 1.2
Per capita income
population aged 60+ : Per
capita income population
aged 15-59
   Autarchy 0.553 0.478 0.413 0.360 0.327 0.307 0.295
   Globalization 0.553 0.482 0.419 0.367 0.334 0.311 0.296
   Difference 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.001
Slow-aging countries
Total income
(1995 US$ per capita)
   Autarchy 986 1,175 1,444 1,780 2,254 2,931 11,210
   Globalization 986 1,135 1,396 1,723 2,192 2,858 11,152
   Difference (%) 0.0 -3.4 -3.3 -3.2 -2.8 -2.5 -0.5
Compensation of employees
   Autarchy 234 362 490 665 900 1,223 5,654
   Globalization 234 375 514 699 943 1,270 5,624
   Difference (%) 0.0 3.7 4.9 5.2 4.7 3.9 -0.5
Annuity income
   Autarchy 392 340 427 543 679 917 3,142
   Globalization 392 269 329 422 543 765 3,125
   Difference (%) 0.0 -20.8 -22.9 -22.3 -20.1 -16.6 -0.5
Social security benefits (incl.
intrafamily transfers)
   Autarchy 360 474 527 572 674 792 2,415
    Globalization 360 491 553 602 706 823 2,403
   Difference (%) 0.0 3.7 4.9 5.2 4.7 3.9 -0.5
Per capita income
population aged 60+ : Per
capita income population
aged 15-59
   Autarchy 0.510 0.404 0.370 0.338 0.318 0.305 0.255
   Globalization 0.510 0.380 0.346 0.316 0.298 0.289 0.259
   Difference (%) 0.000 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.019 -0.016 0.004
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system receipts will, in theory, be depressed by the reduced wage bill. The story in
reverse applies to pensioners in the SACs: higher wages will permit greater saving, but
lower rates of return to capital retard accumulation; higher wages will increase PAYG
pension system receipts and benefits (as well as enhance the working-age population´s
ability to transfer money to parents). However, higher elderly labor force participation
rates in SACs enhance the importance of wage income for the older population.
Model simulation results suggest that, on average, greater capital mobility benefits the
FAC retirement-age population. However, for the first group, the total impact is slight:
annuity income is higher under the Globalization Scenario, but income derived from
social security benefits is lower because of the reduced wage bill. Total per capita
income of the retirement-age FAC population is estimated to be increased by only 0.3%
(vis à vis the Autarchy Scenario) in 2010, 0.4% in 2020-2040 (estimated to be the years
of greatest stress on public pension systems); and by 2050, any gain has disappeared.
However, the apparently marginal impact of globalization on the elderly population as a
whole may hide considerable disparities within the age group. So long as upper-income
retirees continue to depend disproportionately on income derived from assets, and
lower-income retirees to depend almost entirely on public social security system
benefits, globalization is likely to widen income disparity among aged households.
The working-age FAC population, which derives no income from annuities and earns
lower real wages as a result of reduced capital per worker, sees a decline in its income
relative to the Autarchy Scenario: 0.6% in 2010, rising to a peak of 1.7% in 2040-2050.
In SACs, the distributional tilt is reversed: capital inflows help the working-age
population but hurt those in the retirement age bracket; in both cases, the impact is
relatively more significant than in FACs. Total income per capita for the population
aged 15-59 is increased (in the Globalization Scenario relative to the Autarchy
Scenario) by 2.5% in 2010, rising to 3.8% in 2030 and then diminishing.  Total income
per capita for the population aged 60+ is reduced (vis à vis the baseline scenario) by
3.4% in 2010, with the impact gradually diminishing but still amounting to 2.5% in
2050. The effect on the working-age population is obvious: more capital per worker
translates into a higher wage income. The impact on persons over 60, however, is
subject to one qualification: it seems likely that as workers’ wages benefited
substantially, and as elderly persons´ income derived from capital was squeezed by
lower rates of return, intrafamily transfers would be set in motion. However, the basic
insights of the model simulation, i.e., that globalization tends disproportionately to
benefit the working-age population in SACs, and that distributional impacts in the South
are likely to be more significant than in the North, would appear to be sound.
Conclusion
What difference would a high degree of financial integration between the fast-aging and
slow-aging regions of the world make for the macroeconomic impact of population
aging? Our simulation with a two-region neoclassical economic-demographic model
reaches two basic conclusions of importance to policy makers.
First, capital flows from fast-aging, mostly industrialized countries to slow-aging,
mostly developing countries can slightly attenuate, but not reverse, the consequences of
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an aging population. Population aging will lead to a falling rate of return on capital
despite declining net saving rates. We estimate that the rate of return to capital in FACs
will decline by approximately 200 basis points between 1995 and 2050 regardless of the
degree of global financial integration. The net saving rate in FACs is estimated to
decline from 8.3% in 1995 to 7.3% in 2050 even under the Globalization Scenario, as
opposed to 6.6% under the Autarchy Scenario. The benefits of higher income (as
measured by GNP per capita) resulting from more efficient allocation of investment are
insignificant in the near term and, even by 2050, amount to only 1.7%.
Second, our simulation finds that significant distributional effects are likely to arise
from the interaction of population aging and financial integration. While increased
mobility of capital will hurt the working-age population in FACs, it will benefit much
more significantly the working-age population in SACs. Within the elderly population,
impacts are likely to differ by income group. While increased capital mobility will
benefit those retirement-age households in FACs who have access to funded pensions
(including personal retirement savings outside the pension system), it will hurt
households that are still dependent on unfunded, payroll tax-financed PAYG pension
systems. In other words, globalization benefits elderly lifetime-savers, consisting
disproportionately of the well-to-do, but hurts elderly lifetime nonsavers, consisting
disproportionately of the poor. One interpretation of this is that globalization increases
the urgency of implementing policies that encourage or force poor households to save.
Such neoclassical results admittedly ignore dynamic efficiency gains from integration,
as well as the risk-reduction that results from a more widely diversified portfolio.
However, they point to a new dimension of the globalization debate, namely the age
dimension.
In conclusion, nothing in our analysis suggests that capital mobility can “beat
demography”. International financial integration is only one of the broad range of
policies affecting pensions, retirement, and health care that will be necessary to reduce
the impacts of population aging.
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Annex 1:The IIASA Multiregional Economic-Demographic
Model
While generalizable to the multi-region case, we present the model in terms of two
regions: Region 1 corresponds to fast-aging countries (FACs) and Region 2 corresponds
to slow-aging countries (SACs).  Since model structures in Region 1 and 2 are
symmetrical, we present only Region 1.  Unless necessary for clarity, the time argument
is suppressed.  The subscripts 11,12 and 21 are used to index flows from 1 to 1, from 1
to 2, and from 2 to 1, respectively.   The asterisk operator is used to denote summation
over regions (e.g., 1* denotes from 1 to 1 plus from 1 to 2).  The asterisk is also used to
denote summation over population age groups, types of capital, etc.
Population, labor force, employment, and households
Population is divided into three age groups, 0-14 years, 15-59 years, and 60+ years,
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Output and rates of return to factors
Gross domestic product (GDP) is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function and
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where g is the rate of total factor productivity growth; R is the gross profit rate,
including depreciation and indirect taxes net of subsidies; and W is the rate of employee
compensation, including social insurance contributions (workers´ and employers´
contributions to public and private pension schemes).   The double subscript on capital
refers to the fact that claims on the capital installed in Region 1 are held both in Region
1 and in Region 2.
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where IndTaxRate is defined with respect to GDP and δ1 is the depreciation rate.  The
advantage of netting out depreciation and indirect taxes is that we can ignore them in
calculating income, outlay, and net savings.  However, we will need to add them when
calculating net factor payments from abroad and gross national product (GNP).
The structure of capital, its location, and the nature of claims
Capital is either residential (Res) or nonresidential (NonRes); the latter is further
subdivided into capital operated by private unincorporated enterprises (PUEs) and
capital operated by firms, i.e., corporate enterprises.  Residential capital and capital
operated by PUEs are installed entirely in the home region and are held by households
directly. Capital operated by corporate enterprises is installed either at home or abroad.
Financial claims on this capital are held on behalf of households by institutions that
collect dividends and pay out annuities.
These institutions are subdivided into those that comprise the private pension system
(PPS) and other institutions (OIs) such as banks and mutual funds.   As discussed in the
main body of the text, the PPS includes only the fully funded, defined-contribution
component of the private pension system; pay-as-you-go (PAYG) corporate pension
funds being implicitly included under the public PAYG system.
Firms in our model operate capital, either distributing or reinvesting earnings that
accrue; they do not own shares in other firms. Therefore, included among OIs are
corporate holding companies that engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) on behalf of
domestic firms.  Also implicitly included among OIs are households themselves to the
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extent that they individually hold claims on corporate assets.14  No distinction is made
between equity and debt claims on corporations, nor does government debt play a role.
In summary,
 KOI KPPS KPUE sK = K 1*1*111* Re +++
*1*111*1 Re KOI KPPS KPUE sK = K +++
where
21111* KPPS KPPS = KPPS +
 KOI KOI = KOI 21111* +
 KPPS KPPS = KPPS 1211*1 +
 KOI KOI = KOI 1211*1 +
Because only capital operated by firms can be located abroad, all international claims
are held entirely by the PPS and OIs:
121212 KOI KPPS = K +
We assume that all foreign assets held by the PPS consist of portfolio investment, and
only the foreign assets of OIs contain an FDI component, which is determined by an
exogenous share coefficient:
121212 KOIPort KOIFDI = KOI +
 KOI ShareKOIFDI = KOIFDI 121212  
( )  KOI ShareKOIFDI = KOIPort 121212  1−
The distinction between portfolio investment and FDI has important consequences for
national saving.  Earnings (and net savings therefrom), which accrue to capital claimed
by foreign portfolio investors are credited to the firm that operates the capital (i.e., to the
region in which the capital is installed).  Earnings, and net savings therefrom, which
                                                
14
 In accounting for the annuitization of the 60+ population´s assets consisting of capital operated by PUEs and
residential capital, we assume that OIs play the intermediary role.  However, in order to simplify notation, we define
KOI as consisting entirely of capital operated by firms and deal with KPUE60+ and KRes60+ separately.  One way of
interpreting this is that households retain title to these assets, but assign the income earned from them to OIs in return
for an annuity.
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accrue to capital claimed by foreign direct investors are credited to the parent firm, and
therefore to the region of the claimant.
The age structure of capital ownership
Ideally, each cohort should be tracked as it accumulates capital during its working life
and draws it down during retirement.  An expedient measure (particularly for model
applications in which the age structure of populations is invariant between the baseline
and alternative scenarios) is to share down the aggregate capital stock by age of owner.
The assumption is made that the age structure of all forms of capital (residential and
nonresidential; operated by firms and PUEs; installed at home or abroad; held by the
PPS and OIs) is identical.  Assuming that persons under 15 do not own capital, this
leaves us with:
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This leaves us with the problem of estimating the share variable.  In Annex 2, we
present a  model from demography that results in the following expression:
( )( )
































where AR is the average age of the population aged over 60 and AW is the average age of
the population  aged 15-59.
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Income, outlay and net saving of households
In the System of National Accounts (SNA), national income and saving are assigned to
households, firms, and government.  In order to highlight the role of age structure, the
income and outlay of households are split into payments and receipts of households
proper and the income and outlay of the PPS and OIs, which hold financial claims on
behalf of households.  Examples of such receipts and payments would be receipt of
stock dividends from firms and payment of annuities to the retirement-age population.
We do not articulate households´ deposits to the banking system (and purchases of
mutual fund shares) as a debit to households and a credit to OIs; in this sense, income
minus outlay of the OIs gives a misleading picture of the flow of funds.  However, the
sum of income minus outlay across the population aged 15-59, the population aged 60+,
the PPS, and OIs gives us the household net saving concept familiar from the SNA (see
Table 3 in the main body of this paper).
Income, outlay, and net saving of the population aged 15-59
Persons of working age receive wage income, entrepreneurial income in the form of
profits from PUEs, imputed rental services of residential capital, and transfers from
persons aged over 60.   As we discuss later, the latter implicitly include bequests.  Pre-











−+−−−− +++ TransPop ntYPop EntrYPopWageYPop = YPop
We retain “Pop” in all income acronyms to stress that these variables refer to the
income of persons, not the income of households.  At a subsequent stage of model
development, it is hoped to assign individuals, and the income they receive, to
households of various structures, at which point it will be possible to calculate true
household income.
In the following, we examine each of these income streams and the associated
expenditures.
Income, outlay, and net saving related to wage income.  Out of pre-tax wage
income, persons aged 15-19 pay direct taxes and social insurance contributions, the
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−− EmpWDirTaxRate = YPopDirTaxWage
The direct tax rate is assumed to apply equally to all domestic factor incomes.  Social
insurance contributions consist of contributions to the public PAYG defined-benefit







−−− + eYPopPPSContWagtWageYPop SocSecCon= WageYPopSocInsCont
Social security system and PPS contributions are taken out of gross compensation of
employees.  The contribution rate is assumed to be the same for both age groups;
therefore, it is not indexed by age.  It is also assumed to be the same for both wage
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− opConsWageYPopDispWageYP = eYPopNetSvngWag
Income, outlay, and net saving related to KPUE15-59.  The treatment of entrepreneurial






































−− EntrYPopePPSContRat = rYPopPPSContEnt
Consumption is again calculated by means of an exogenous age-specific share, and the















− opConsEntrYP opDispEntrYP= rYPopNetSvngEnt
Recall that depreciation and indirect taxes have already been netted out of income
accruing to capital.
Income, outlay, and net saving related to KRes15-59.   Imputed rents to residential housing
are taxed similar to any other form of income; the residual is consumed, so there is no























−− ntYPopDisp = ntYPopCons
As in the case of entrepreneurial income, depreciation and indirect taxes have already
been netted out.
Income, outlay, and net saving related to transfers/bequests.  All income not consumed
by persons aged 60+ is transferred to those aged 15-59 years.  This includes the annuity
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Recall that net saving out of rental income was assumed to be zero.
Income, outlay, and net saving of the population aged 60+
Persons above retirement age receive wage income if they are still employed, annuity
income derived from their capital assets, and benefits from the public PAYG social
security system.
The level of social security benefits is dictated by current revenues flowing into the
system (i.e., we assume that no surplus is accumulated and there is no deficit financed
from general revenue).   As discussed in the main body of the paper, this means that the
pressures of population aging are translated into lower levels of benefit, rather than
higher payroll taxes or deeper fiscal deficits.  In order to simplify accounting, persons
are assumed to start receiving social security benefits at 60 years of age regardless of
labor-force status.
For the same reason, annuitization of assets is assumed to commence at 60 whether the
individual is retired or not.  The 60+ population´s claims on all forms of capital is
translated into annuity income based on the prevailing rate of return to capital and life
expectancy at 60.







1 SocSecBenAnnYPop WageYPop = YPop ++
+++
We proceed to look at each of these components and expenditures out of each income
stream.
Income, outlay, and net saving related to wage income.  Wage and entrepreneurial














































1 ConsWageYDispWageY = eYNetSvngWag
Income, outlay, and net saving  related to KPPS60+ , KOI60+ , KPUE60+ , and KRes60+ .
Persons over 60 derive annuity income from the PPS and OIs, which hold financial
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We make the simplifying assumption (in the first two cases) that assets are annuitized in
the domestic market regardless of whether they consist of claims on capital installed at
home or abroad.















1   pConsAnnYPopDispAnnYPo = YPopNetSvngAnn
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Income, outlay, and net saving related to social security benefits. Social security
benefits are assumed to be untaxed.
111  SocSecBenocSecBenConsShareS = BenConsSocSec
111  BenConsSocSec SocSecBen= SecBenNetSvngSoc −
Transfers/bequests.  Transfers/bequests from the population aged 60+ to the population
aged 15-59 are calculated as the residual left after consumption has been deducted from







1  SecBenNetSvngSoc YPopNetSvngAnn eYPopNetSvngWagTransPop ++=
++−+
Net saving.  Given the calculation of transfers/bequests, net saving of the population
aged 60+ is by definition zero.
Total private consumption
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Income, outlay, and net savings of the PPS and OIs
The PPS and OIs are dummy sectors in that they merely hold assets on behalf of
households.  The PPS receives workers´and employers´ contributions and dividends
distributed by firms. Since corporate profits are taxed when (and where) earned, these












In the case of claims corresponding to domestic capital (the first dividend term in the
expression above), the dividend is debited to firms in Region 1; in the case of claims
consisting of portfolio investment abroad (the second dividend term), the dividend is
debited from firms in Region 2.





*111 AnnValKPPS DispYPPS = NetSvngPPS
OIs receive dividends in the same way as the PPS, in addition to which they receive
dividends distributed from repatriated earnings on FDI.  Because OIs are assumed to
intermediate retirees´ annuitization of their holdings of KPUE and KRes; they are
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sKrKPUEr
 IFDIpatErngsKODivDistrmsKOIPortDivDistYFirmsKOIDivDistYFi = DispYOI








*111 Re sAnnValKAnnValKPUEAnnValKOI DispYOI = NetSvngOI
Note that, as defined here, net savings of the PPS are quite close to the net flow of funds
into the PPS, because inflows to the PPS consist only of dividends and pension
contributions.  By contrast, net savings of OIs are nowhere close to the net flow of funds
into OIs.  This is because OIs receive inflows of deposits from other savers, particularly
households.  It would be possible to make these flows explicit, debiting deposits from
other actors and crediting them to the OIs.  However, this would contribute very little to
our basic purpose, which is to make explicit the accumulation of assets prior to age 60
and their annuitization after age 60.
Net saving of households
Because saving of the population aged 60+ is zero after transfers and bequests have
been taken into account, total net saving from household income is
11
5915
11 NetSvngOINetSvngPPSNetSvngPop = NetSvngHH ++
−
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Income, outlay, and net savings of firms
Income and outlay related to capital installed in Region 1
Firms operate capital installed at home and abroad; they earn profits and pay out direct
taxes and dividends.  In the case of FDI in Region 2, firms in Region 1 make a two-
stage decision:  (i) what proportion of earnings abroad to repatriate (and, the
complementary decision, what proportion to reinvest); and (ii) what proportion of
remitted earnings to pay out as dividends.  Earnings on capital owned by foreigners (i.e.,
KPPS21 and KOI21 from the standpoint of firms in Region 1) are credited to the firm in
Region 1 if the claim represents portfolio investment from Region 2, but to the firm in




11111 KPPSr = YFirmsKPPS
  
*
11111 KOIr = YFirmsKOI
  
*
21121 KPPSr = YFirmsKPPS
  
*
21121 KOIPortr = ortYFirmsKOIP
Note that all of these flows are net of depreciation and indirect taxes.




11111 YFirmsKPPSDirTaxRate = msKPPSDirTaxYFir
  
*
11111 YFirmsKOIDirTaxRate = OITaxYFirmsKDir
  
*
21121 YFirmsKPPSDirTaxRate = msKPPSDirTaxYFir
  
*
21121 ortYFirmsKOIPDirTaxRate = msKOIPortDirTaxYFir
and the sum represents total direct taxes paid by firms in Region 1 to the government of
Region 1:
 msKOIPort DirTaxFirsKOIDirTaxFirmsKPPSDirTaxFirm = msDirTaxYFir
  21111*11 ++
Dividend distributions are made out of pre-tax earnings, and the proportion of earnings
distributed is assumed to be independent of the nature of the claim:
  
*




11111 YFirmsKOIeDivDistRat = rmsKOIDivDistYFi
  
*
21121 YFirmsKPPSeDivDistRat = rmsKPPSDivDistYFi
  
*
21121 ortYFirmsKOIPeDivDistRat = rmsKOIPortDivDistYFi
These dividends are credited to the PPS in Region 1, OIs in Region 1, the PPS in
Region 2, and OIs in Region 2, respectively.
Income and outlay related to earnings on FDI abroad
Earnings on capital corresponding to FDI from Region 1 in Region 2 is credited to firms
located in Region 1:
  12212 KOIFDIr = DIYFirmsKOIF
and are, once again, net of depreciation and indirect tax.
Direct taxes on these earnings are paid to the government of Region 2:
12212  DIYFirmsKOIFDirTaxRatemsKOIFDIDirTaxYFir =
Firms set aside a portion for reinvestment abroad:
12 1212  ReRe DIYFirmsKOIFngsFDIInvShareErIFDIinvErngsKO =
where the reinvestment share is an exogenous assumption and is assumed to be applied
to pre-tax earnings. No account is taken of special arrangements for exempting
reinvested earnings on FDI from taxation.
The remainder of earnings on FDI is repatriated to Region 1:
12121212 Re Re IFDIinvErngsKOsKOIFDIDirTaxFirmDIYFirmsKOIFOIFDIpatrErngsK −−=
where dividends are distributed:
 OIFDIpatrErngsKeDivDistRat = OIFDIpatrErngsKDivDist
  12112 Re Re
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and credited to OIs.  It is assumed that, having been taxed once in Region 2, repatriated
earnings are exempt from taxation in Region 1.
Net savings of firms
Net savings of firms are split into two components: savings out of domestic resources
(including earnings repatriated from abroad), and savings in the form of reinvested
earnings on FDI.  The streams that comprise domestic savings of firms in Region 1 are:
        11111111 rmsKPPSDivDistYFi-rmsKPPS DirTaxYFi-KPPSYFirms = rmsKPPSNetSvngYFi
 rmsKOIDivDistYFi-ms KOIDirTaxYFirYFirmsKOI = rmsKOINetSvngYFi 11111111     -  
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 IFDIpatErngsKODivDistIFDIpatErngsKO = IFDIpatErngsKOSvngNet 211212 Re - Re  Re












Foreign savings are simply reinvested earnings on FDI, i.e.:
 Re
 121 IFDIInvErngsKOYFirmsNetForSvng =
and total net saving from corporate income in Region 1 is the sum of the two:
 1 11  YFirmsNetForSvngYFirmsNetDomSvngmsNetSvngFir +=
Income, outlay, and net saving of government













           









Recall that the 60+ population pays direct taxes (and social insurance contributions)
only on wage income.  Indirect taxes are calculated as:
111  GDPIndTaxRateIndTax =
Government expenditure consists of government consumption and social security
benefits, and income minus expenditure gives government net savings as:
1111 SocSecBenGovConsYGovNetSvngGov −−=
Because the public social security system is assumed to be PAYG, social security outlay





In other words, net saving of the public pension system is assumed to be zero.
Government consumption is calculated by means of an exogenous share coefficient:
111 GDPreGovConsShaGovCons =
Sharing out saving into investment
A major simplifying assumption is that investment in each region is constrained by the
supply of capital, i.e., that investment always equals the amount of savings made
available.  The approach followed is to share out available savings into different types
of investment, some mobile and some immobile, and then share out the former between
regions based on exogenous flow coefficients.
Total net savings of Region 1 are:
121111 Re IFDIinvErngsKONetSvngGovFirmsNetDomSvngNetSvngHHNetSvngTot +++=
of which the domestic component is:
1111 NetSvngGovFirmsNetDomSvngNetSvngHHTotNetDomSvng ++=
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Residential and nonresidential investment are calculated from domestic savings by
means of an exogenous share coefficient:
111 ReRe ngTot  NetDomSvsInvSharesdK =
( ) 1211*1 Re Re1Re IFDIinvErngsKOTotNetDomSvngsInvSharesdKNon +−=
Residential investment takes place exclusively in the home region; however,
nonresidential investment can take place either at home or abroad.  Investment in PUEs
is estimated as a share of nonresidential investment (apart from reinvestment of FDI
earnings):
( )12111 ReRe FDIinvErngKOIsdKNonePUEInvShardKPUE * −=
Total investment minus residential investment minus investment in PUEs equals
investment in capital operated by firms; claims on these are by definition held either by
the PPS or by OIs.
We assume that change in capital claimed by the PPS is equal to net savings of this
sector, which is sensible as we have more or less enumerated all the sources and uses of
funds for this sector.  The residual, i.e., investment from all savings not mediated
through the PPS, is assigned to OIs:
1*1 NetSvngPPSdKPPS =
*1*1*1 Re dKPPSsdKNondKOI −=
Regional sharedown
Investment is shared down into location of the project by means of exogenous capital
flow coefficients.  In the case of the PPS, this is straightforward:
PPSdKPPSdKPPS 11*111  ϕ=
( )PPSdKPPSdKPPS 11*112 -1 ϕ=
In the case of the OIs, the only complication is that we do not wish to share out
reinvested earnings on FDI, which are by definition allocated to Region 2:
( ) OI
*
IFDIinvErngsKO -dKOIdKOI 1112111  Re ϕ=
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( )( ) 121112*112 Re  -1 Re IFDIinvErngsKOIFDIinvErngsKO-dKOIdKOI OI += ϕ
Calculation of capital stocks
Capital stocks are cumulated year by year:
111 Re)1(ReRe sdKsKsK +−=
111 )1( dKPUEKPUEKPUE +−=
111111 )1( dKPPSKPPSKPPS +−=
121212 )1( dKPPSKPPSKPPS +−=
111111 )1( dKOIKOFIKOI +−=
121212 )1( dKOIKOFIKOI +−=
There is no need to account for depreciation as this has already been netted out in
calculating saving.
Domestic capital formation also includes investment from Region 2, using the same
procedure as above:
212121 )1( dKPPSKPPSKPPS +−=
212121 )1( dKOFIKOFIKOFI +−=
Calculation of gross national product (GNP) and national disposable income
Net (in the sense of receipts minus outlays) factor payments from abroad represent the
sum of net dividend payments, net after-tax earnings on FDI (whether remitted or
reinvested), net depreciation allowances, and net payments of indirect tax.  Recalling
that we now have to adjust for depreciation and indirect taxes, gross factor payments



























National disposable income is GNP adjusted for depreciation and indirect taxes:
122112211111 IndTaxIndTaxKKGNPNatDispY −+−−= δδ
National net savings are equal to national disposable income minus consumption:
1
*
111 Pr GovConsivConsNatDispYNatNetSvng −−=
Accounting checks
Two accounting checks are applied to confirm the consistency of the model.  The first
of these is to prove that net national savings calculated as national disposable income
minus consumption is equal to the sum of net savings across sectors.  The second is to
prove that net national savings equals total acquisition of capital assets, i.e. that the flow
of funds is consistent with changes in the balance sheet.











where NatDispY1 is defined as above.  We proceed by building up net savings sector by
sector.
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Net savings of the population aged over 60 are equal to zero because all unspent income
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12121221 Re IFDIpatErngsKOmsKOIFDIDirTaxYFirKOIFDIrYFirmsNetForSvng −−=
where net foreign savings are simply reinvested earnings on FDI abroad.
Net savings of government












              

















We add together net savings of households, firms, and government canceling terms
across sectors.  The major cancellations are (i) receipts and disbursements related to
direct taxes and the social security, (ii) current receipts and disbursements related to the
private pension system (not counting annuity payments to the retirement-age
population), and (iii) receipts and disbursements in the form of annuities received by the

































































111*1* Re sKKPUEKOIFDIKOIPortKOIKPPSK +++++=
Since income from KOIFDI21 is assigned to firms in Region 2, savings from this income
stream do not appear in the lengthy expression above.  We rewrite as follows,








































































































































































where the last line is net national savings.
The second check consists of making sure that net national savings are completely

















Residential and non-residential investment are calculated as shares of total domestic
investment:
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111 ReRe TotNetDomSvngsInvSharesdK =
Re-expressing non-residential investment as the sum across types of investment
=++++= 121211111*1Re dKOIdKPPSdKOIdKPPSdKPUEsdKNon
We now substitute these expressions in national net savings:
*11
121211111112111






















( ) 12IFDIInvErngsKOTotNetDomSvngsInvSharesdKNon ReRe1Re 11*1 +−=
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Annex 2: The Age Structure of Capital Ownership
Let the age of retirement be denoted R (60 in our model) and assume that it remains
constant.  If the length of working life (LWL) is also assumed to remain constant, then
average age during the working age span (A
w
) will also be constant.  Average age
during the retirement age span (AR) will depend on age at retirement and life expectancy
at R in year t:
( )
2
)()( tER = tA RR
+
Assume that the age distribution of the population in year t is such that the average
worker is aged A
w
 and the average person over age R is aged AR.  This need not be the
case, but extreme departures from the assumption are unlikely.
The economic growth rate, g, the real rate of return to capital, r, and the saving rate, s,
are all assumed to remain constant over time.  In any year there is a uniform wage rate
earned by all workers, w(t), which is assumed to grow over time at rate g.  All savings
come out of wage income, and we ignore the fact that some workers die before they
retire.
Assume that saving takes place at a constant rate over the working age span. 
 
 Then,
ignoring the effects of compounding, the assets of the average member of the working-
age population in year t are:
( ) LWLtws = tAk W  )(  5.0,
Assume that, upon retirement, capital ceases to earn a rate of return (i.e., retirees
convert their assets into cash) and that retirees dissave so that, when they reach AR, half
of their original accumulation is depleted.  The assets of the average member of the
retirement-age population are then:
( ) ( )[ ]RAtRk = tAk RR −−, 5.0,
For example, if the retirement age is 60 and the average age of the post-retirement age
span is 70, the assets of a 70 year-old in year t are equal to half his/her assets at age 60
in year t – 10.  As all saving in this individual´s life span occurred at age AW,
( ) ( )[ ]( )( )WARWRWR rAAtAk = tAk −+−− 1 , 5.0,
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( )[ ] ( )( )WARWR rLWLAAtws = −+−− 1    25.0
To continue with this example, if the average age of saving is 40, our 70 year-old
acquired his/her assets, on average, 30 years ago and earned a rate of return r for 20
years, at which point he/she retired and began to consume the accumulation.
Let KW, and KR denote capital owned by the working-age population and capital owned
by the retirement-age population, respectively.  Then the share of total capital owned by
persons in the working age span, SW(t), is
( )









( )[ ] ( )( ){ } )( 1     25.0)(  )( 










Because wages grow at rate g,






and the expression reduces to
( )( )























Thus, the share of capital owned by the working-age population is directly related to the
rate of economic growth and inversely related to the rate of return to capital.  This
makes sense; workers´ savings grow faster as g increases, whereas retirees´
decumulation is unaffected.  Higher r redistributes capital towards the older population
because the elderly have more time to reap the benefits of compounding.  Finally, an
increase in life expectancy at 60, resulting in higher AR, increases the share of capital
owned by older persons (even holding population  age structure constant) because it
increases the number of years over which capital is held prior to depletion.
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The discussion above assumes that r and g remain constant.  In long-run model
simulations, change in these rates will be incremental, so results will not be sensitive to
dropping this assumption.  Thus, the relationship incorporated in the model is
( )( )
































AR is taken (as above) as the average of 60 and life expectancy at 60; AW is calculated
based on the age-specific population projection as the average age of the 15-59 year-old
population.
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Annex 3: Parameters and Assumptions
Parameterization and initialization assumptions were ad hoc, but this should not greatly
affect the marginal simulation properties of the model.  That is, refining the rough
assumptions set forth below probably would not affect our baseline versus alternative
scenario conclusions substantively.
Demography and labor markets
Demographic assumptions, taken from the IIASA Central Scenario population
projection (Lutz, 1996), have been summarized above.  “Fast-aging countries” (FACs)
and “slow-aging countries” (SACs) correspond to “industrial” and “developing”
countries in the IIASA projection.
Life expectancy at age 60 was assumed to rise from 25 to 35 years in FACs and from 15
to 25 years in SACs over the period 1995-2100; these increases are in line with the
mortality assumptions that underlie the IIASA population projection.  Average age
above 60 years was assumed to rise from 72.5 to 77.5 in FACs and from 67.5 to 72.5 in
SACs.  The average age of the population aged 15-59 was assumed to remain constant
at 37.5 in both regions.
Based on estimates from the International Labour Organisation (ILO), labor-force
participation rates at age 15-59 (both sexes combined) in the two regions were assumed
to be 0.75 over the entire simulation period.  Labor-force participation rates over age 60
were assumed to remain constant at 0.05 in FACs and 0.10 in SACs.
The production function
The ß coefficient in the Cobb-Douglas production function was assumed to be 0.33 in
both FACs and SACs.  The rate of total factor productivity growth was assumed to be
1% per year in FACs and 2% per year in SACs.  Information from various sources led
us to initialize the model on 1995 per capita GDP levels of approximately $25,000 and
$1,500 in FACS and SACs, respectively.
Social insurance contribution rates
It was assumed in FACs that 3% of pre-tax compensation of employees was contributed
to private pension plans.  The contribution rate out of entrepreneurial income was
likewise assumed to be 3%.  In SACs these contribution rates were assumed to be 2.5%.




In both regions, it was assumed for the population aged 15-59 that the average
propensities to consume out of disposable wage income, entrepreneurial income, and
transfers/bequests were 0.95, 0.5, and 0.5, respectively.  All imputed rental income was
assumed to be consumed.   For the population aged over 60, it was assumed in both
regions that the consumption rates out of wage income, annuity income, and social
security benefits were 0.95, 0.9. and 1.0, respectively.
Taxes and government consumption
The direct tax rate (relative to wages and profits) was assumed to be 0.15 in both FACs
and SACs.  The indirect tax rate (relative to GDP) was set at 0.075 in FACs and 0.100
in SACs.  Government consumption was assumed to be 20% of GDP in both regions.
Dividends and reinvestment of earnings on FDI
Firms in both regions were assumed to pay out 15% of pre-tax profits to holders of
claims, as well as 15% of repatriated earnings on FDI abroad.  Assumptions on the
share of FDI earnings reinvested in the host country are discussed in the main body of
the paper.
Residential investment and investment in PUEs
In both regions, the share of net domestic saving allocated to residential investment was
assumed to be 20%.  The share of PUEs in total nonresidential investment (excluding
reinvestment of earnings on FDI from abroad) was also assumed to be 20%.
Sharing out investment between regions
Assumptions made regarding the allocation of investment between domestic and foreign
regions have been discussed in the main body of the paper.
Initializing capital stocks and claims
Total initial capital stocks were calculated based on the assumed per capita GDP levels
given above and assumed capital-output ratios of approximately 3.0 in FACs and 2.5 in
SACs.  The depreciation rate was assumed to be 4% per year in FACs and 6% per year
in SACs.
In both regions, it was assumed that 1% of all initial claims on capital consisted of
claims on capital installed in the foreign region (i.e., K12 / K1*   = 0.01 and K21 / K2*   =
0.01).  33% of K
*1 and 33% of K*2 were assumed to consist of residential capital;
similarly, 33% of K
*1 and 33% of K*2 were assumed to consist of capital  operated by
PUEs.
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For FACs, total claims of the PPS were assumed to be $7,865 billion based on data
given in Table 1; based on World Bank (1997) estimates, $70 billion of this total was
assumed to consist of claims on capital installed in SACs.  This allowed calculation of
KPPS11, KOI12, and KOI11 as residuals.  For SACs, total claims of the PPS were assumed
to be $311 billion based on the data in Table 1, and the initial-year value of KPPS21 was
assumed to be zero.
FDI claims were assumed to account for 50% of initial-year KOI12 and KOI21.
